residual control造句
例句與造句
- Detectability analysis of residual control charts for monitoring change in mean deviation
監(jiān)視過程均值變化的殘差控制圖檢測能力分析 - The reform of corporate governance hi china is characterized by the shifting of residual control and benefit to the managers
我國公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革是以公司的決策權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)逐步轉(zhuǎn)移到經(jīng)營者手中為特征的。 - From the practice of the western corporations , we found that making the management supervisors to be the stockholders and partly have the power of residual control and residual income is an important way to reply this problem
從西方國家的市場實(shí)踐來看，引入管理層持股機(jī)制，使管理者尤其是高層管理者擁有部分“剩余控制權(quán)”和“剩余索取權(quán)” ，成為應(yīng)對這一問題的主要對策之一。 - As different financial contracts , equity contracts and debt contracts have different internal request on the structure of corporate governance and play a great role on the allocation and matching of firm ' s residual claims and residual control rights
作為不同的金融契約，股權(quán)和債權(quán)融資契約對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)有不同的內(nèi)生要求，在一定程度上決定著企業(yè)控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)的效率配置。 - In a long time , stockholders possessed the whole residual claim and residual control . however , with the development of the corporate governance , creditors , managers , government and employees come to join in the corporate governance
但隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，其他利益相關(guān)者的地位逐步升高，債權(quán)人、經(jīng)營者、職工和政府都以各種方式體現(xiàn)著對企業(yè)治理的影響，未來企業(yè)治理的發(fā)展趨勢是利益相關(guān)者共同治理。 - It's difficult to find residual control in a sentence. 用residual control造句挺難的
- It is a proper combination of contractual claim , contractual control , residual claim and residual control , which try to satisfy the participation constraint and efficient principle . efficient property right structure results from market trade and will evolve into a more efficient one
企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)就是通過契約索取權(quán)、契約控制權(quán)、剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)這四者的不同組合，來滿足企業(yè)參與者的參與約束和制度得以生存的效率原則。 - The behave and harm of insider control in state enterprise is discussed . the reason of insider control is analysed , me chain of consign and the lack of proprietor the unmatching of residual control and proceeds ; the deficiency of inspiring with manager ; the disfigurement of supervision and restriction etc are the reasons of insider control . the advice of controlling insider control is discussed from the angle of game theory , and think that big shareholders of enterprise have more power to supervise operator . in order to settle the question of insider control , the bestiring and inhibiting of manager should be consolidated . the superiority of employees in enterprise is emphasized in controlling insider control . the paper puts forward a new model to measure intrinsic value of human capital of manager , the compenhensive valuation metrix to decide the efficenncy of management and performance adjustment of human capital of manager
這是本文研究的意義所在。本文論述了我國國有企業(yè)內(nèi)部人控制問題的表現(xiàn)和危害，比較了我國國有企業(yè)與國外企業(yè)的內(nèi)部人控制問題的差異及特點(diǎn)。在分析委托代理鏈冗長及所有者缺位、經(jīng)營者剩余控制權(quán)和剩余收益權(quán)不匹配、對公司經(jīng)理人員的激勵嚴(yán)重不足、監(jiān)督約束機(jī)制不健全等是形成國有企業(yè)內(nèi)部人控制的主要原因的基礎(chǔ)上，從博弈論的角度探討控制內(nèi)部人控制問題的政策建議，認(rèn)為股權(quán)集中的大股東有更強(qiáng)的動力去監(jiān)督目標(biāo)公司，解決內(nèi)部人控制問題在于強(qiáng)化對經(jīng)理人員的約束、激勵。 - With the analysis of this model , this paper point out that the distribution of ownership and the control right are according with what we learned form the modern enterprise theory in which the residual claim right be required to match with the residual control right in nature , but there is difference between them in the form to the venture enterprise coming from the character of venture investment
通過對模型及其擴(kuò)展形式的分析得出，在風(fēng)險企業(yè)中的控制權(quán)與所有權(quán)的分配在本質(zhì)上與現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論中所強(qiáng)調(diào)的“剩余控制權(quán)與剩余索取權(quán)相匹配”是一致的，但是因?yàn)轱L(fēng)險投資的特點(diǎn)而在形式上有所不同。 - Being based upon the modern economy ' s new characteristic , through the analyzing of the traditional theory about the distribution of the residual control rights and residual claim of the firm , this paper discusses the residual control rights " distribution among the providers of the firm capital . then , the paper analyses the theoretical foundation , mode and nature of human capital participating in the distribution of the residual returns
本文立足于當(dāng)代社會經(jīng)濟(jì)的新特點(diǎn)，通過對傳統(tǒng)的企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)分布和剩余收益分配理論的剖析，探討新的知識經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下企業(yè)的剩余控制權(quán)在不同資本提供者之間的分布特點(diǎn)，并以此為基礎(chǔ)，分析人力資本參與企業(yè)剩余收益分配的理論基礎(chǔ)及其方式和特點(diǎn)。 - Generally corporate governance is legal , cultural and systemic arrangement about residual control and claim . capital structure is the most important aspect of corporate governance , which can harmonize the profit and action between investor and manager , shareholder and creditor through shareholding and creditor ' s rights . property structure is the base of property right which decides the structure and running of corporate governance
廣義地講公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是指有關(guān)公司控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)分配的一整套法律、文化和制度性安排，資本結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)最重要的一個方面，資本結(jié)構(gòu)可通過股權(quán)和債權(quán)持有作用的發(fā)揮及其合理配置來協(xié)調(diào)出資人與經(jīng)營者之間、出資人內(nèi)部股東與債權(quán)人之間的利益和行為；股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ)，它決定了整個公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的構(gòu)成和運(yùn)作。 - Entreprices " financing pattern together with capital structure will exert influence on behaviours and interests of its every correlated individual . securities , as financial contract , contain allocation of its residual sourcing claims and residual control rights . therefore , choosing finanacing pattern and capital structure is by nature to choose entreprices " governance institution , thus its securities are of different features
企業(yè)融資方式、資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇對企業(yè)各利益相關(guān)主體的行為、利益產(chǎn)生影響，作為金融契約的企業(yè)證券包含了企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)的配置，從本質(zhì)上講，企業(yè)融資方式、資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇就是企業(yè)治理機(jī)制的選擇，作為金融契約的企業(yè)融資證券包含著不同的企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)特征。 - The agent of the company takes the residual control and claim of the business enterprise , which causes the asymmetry between the residual control and the residual claim , the managers of the business enterprise have strong incentives to obtain beside cash . the other implicit income mainly includes raising its social status and incumbency consumption
經(jīng)理人以自身利益為目標(biāo)而不是以企業(yè)價值最大化為目標(biāo),通過引入行為金融學(xué)的中前景理論,在此基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建企業(yè)經(jīng)理人價值模型,很好的解釋了上市公司為啥對股權(quán)融資情有獨(dú)忠。 - Chapter 3 adaptive governance structure this chapter first divides the mode of governance structure into the types of stockholder control , manager control , staff control , and co - control , according to the different allocation of the residual control , and studies comparatively these modes . secondly , it analyzes the origination and establishment of enterprise governance structure by studying the theory of separation of ownership and control , agency theory , and incomplete contract theory . at last , this chapter summarizes the new trend of governance structure and puts forward and analyzes adaptive governance structure
首先，根據(jù)剩余控制權(quán)分配形式的不同，把企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)分為股東控制型、經(jīng)理控制型、員工控制型及共同控制型四種模式，并進(jìn)行了比較分析；其次，研究了企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)理論，通過對所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離理論、委托代理理論、不完合契約理論的研究，分析了企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)生及建立的理論基礎(chǔ)；最后，總結(jié)了新環(huán)境下的企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)展的新趨勢，并提出新環(huán)境下的適應(yīng)性治理結(jié)構(gòu)并對適應(yīng)性治理結(jié)構(gòu)做了初步的分析。 - There are some problems as follows : both the residual claims and die residual control making a bad match ; excessive control by insiders ; proporty rights without match of capital ; lack of the real body making good match with market economy ; incomplete market ; lack of real protected property rights
這種治理結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)是：公司的剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán)結(jié)合失當(dāng)，內(nèi)部人控制過度，股權(quán)與資本脫節(jié)，委托和代理一體，管理與經(jīng)營失衡；根本問題是主體缺位、市場幼稚、產(chǎn)權(quán)缺乏切實(shí)保護(hù)；結(jié)果是企業(yè)無效率運(yùn)行。 - In short , on the one hand , human capital is the source of the firm value , because of it ' s own capital nature and then the status of being the element in the value creating . on the other hand , owing to the nature of the property rights of human capital , human capital must depend on the non - human capital at work . so the distribution of the residual control rights is a cooperative game
簡而言之，一方面人力資本由于其自身的資本性質(zhì)以及由此形成的在企業(yè)價值生產(chǎn)中的要素地位而成為企業(yè)價值創(chuàng)造的源泉；而另一方面由于現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)中人力資本產(chǎn)權(quán)的特點(diǎn)，其發(fā)揮作用要依賴于非人力資本（二者的相互關(guān)系表現(xiàn)在人力資本產(chǎn)權(quán)的特點(diǎn)上） ，企業(yè)價值的創(chuàng)造離不開二者的共同作用。